Cooperative bargaining and coalition formation

In this study, I am working on the relationship between coalition formation and bargaining. More specifically, I use a baseline cooperative bargaining model in which a group of agents with symmetric single peaked preferences form coalitions to bargain with a principle. I use this model to study the e ects of the underlying bargaining process on the structure of the coalition formed by the agents, and to classify the properties that form a grand coalition. Later on, I also introduce an alternative cooperative bargaining model to understand the connection between the bargaining process and coalition formation

Proportional resource allocation in dynamic n-player Blotto games

In this note, we introduce a general model of dynamic n-player multi-battle Blotto contests in which asymmetric resources and non-homogeneous battlefield prizes are possible. Each player’s probability of winning the prize in a battlefield is governed by a ratio-form contest success function and players’ resource allocation on that battlefield. We show that there exists a pure subgame perfect equilibrium in which players allocate their resources in proportion to the battlefield prizes for every history. We also give a sufficient condition that if there are two players and the contest success function is of Tullock type, then the subgame perfect equilibrium is unique

Assessing the Bioeconomy's Contribution to Evidence-Based Policy: A Comparative Analysis of Value Added Measurements

As the bioeconomy has gained importance in European policy agendas, several European research institutes have elaborated ad hoc methodologies to measure the size of the European bioeconomy and aid in the monitoring of its performance. This paper reviews the main approaches found in the literature for such a quantification by comparing the different methodologies and the corresponding quantitative findings. The various estimations published might be confusing at first sight, reporting a value added of the European bioeconomy within the large range of EUR 881 billion to EUR 2.3 trillion. However, the study concludes that each approach is best suited to measuring a different aspect of the bioeconomy. Using the different approaches, we estimate that the markets of bio-based products and energy generate EUR 730-790 billion of value added, the use of biomass within the European economy generates EUR 670 billion of value added, and the sourcing of core bioeconomy industries with goods and services generates EUR 270 billion of value added. There is no evidence of an increased use of biomass inputs in EU industries in substitution of fossil resources, nor of a decreasing dependence of traditional bioeconomy industries towards fossil resources over the period 2005-2015.Bioeconomyvalue addedEuropeinput-output tablesbio-based industriesmethodologiesPublishe

Games and contests

The thesis analyzes individuals and self-enforced group strategies in the presence of strategic interaction. The focus of the thesis is on stable states in which there are no non-credible threats. Considering a scenario in which a decision maker faces an ambiguous due date for a task, sophisticated decision makers are more inclined to execute the task earlier than the naive ones. There are approximations of stable states with no non-credible threats where people make choices sequentially and try to end up in the minority. Proportional resource allocation is achievable in US presidential primaries whenever the candidates’ aim is to maximize their votes

Multi-Battle n-Player Dynamic Contests

In presidential primaries, proportional campaign resource allocation to states with respect to their delegate numbers is a desirable concept. To study proportionality, we introduce a novel model for n-player multi-battle dynamic contests. We show that when players maximize their expected number of delegates there is a subgame perfect equilibrium in which players allocate their resources proportionally. However for at least 4 number of states and at least 2 delegates, when players maximize their probability of winning, there is always a distribution of delegates over the states such that population proportionality is not satisfied

Perfect information games where each player acts only once

We study perfect information games played by an infinite sequence of players, each acting only once in the course of the game. We introduce a class of frequency-based minority games and show that these games have no subgame perfect ϵ-equilibrium for any ϵ sufficiently small. Furthermore, we present a number of sufficient conditions to guarantee existence of subgame perfect ϵ-equilibrium.</p

Doing it Now, Later, or Never

We study centipede games played by an infinite sequence of players. Following the literature on time-inconsistent preferences, we distinguish two types of decision makers, naive and sophisticated, and the corresponding solution concepts, naive epsilon-equilibrium and sophisticated epsilon-equilibrium. We show the existence of both naive and sophisticated epsilon-equilibria for each positive epsilon. Under the assumption that the payoff functions are upper semicontinuous, we furthermore show that there exist both naive and sophisticated 0-equilibria in pure strategies. We also compare the probability to stop of a naive versus a sophisticated decision maker and show that a sophisticated decision maker stops earlier. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved

Perfect information games where each player acts only once

We study perfect information games played by an infinite sequence of players, each acting only once in the course of the game. We introduce a class of frequency-based minority games and show that these games have no subgame perfect ϵ-equilibrium for any ϵ sufficiently small. Furthermore, we present a number of sufficient conditions to guarantee existence of subgame perfect ϵ-equilibrium.</p

Perfect information games where each player acts only once

We study perfect information games played by an infinite sequence of players, each acting only once in the course of the game. We introduce a class of frequency-based minority games and show that these games have no subgame perfect $\epsilon$-equilibrium for any $\epsilon$ sufficiently small. Furthermore, we present a number of sufficient conditions to guarantee existence of subgame perfect $\epsilon$-equilibrium

A cross‐country measurement of the EU bioeconomy : An input–output approach

This paper measures the development of the national income share of the bioeconomy for 28 European Union Member States (MS) and 16 industries of BioMonitor scope from 2005 to 2015. The paper proposes a model which includes the up‐ and downstream linkages using Input‐Output tables. The results show that for the majority of the MS the value added of the up‐ and downstream sector is at the band of 40–50% of the total bioeconomy value added and has on average increased since the financial crisis.</p